

# Risky Ethics

## Week 6: Constraints

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### Overview.

Deontological theories often feature constraints, such as constraints against using someone as a mere means. Despite the intuitive force of these constraints, there run into a series of problems when applied to conditions of risk. Caspar Hare demonstrate that, when understood *ex-post*, moral constraints violate a plausible principle about deontic agglomeration. Kacper Kowalczyk demonstrates that when interpreted *ex-ante*, moral theories with constraints violate sequential Pareto.

### Caspar Hare's 'Should We Wish Well to All?'

1. What does Hare mean by 'morality' and 'reasonable beneficence'? How does he contrast these?
2. What are 'constraints-against-bad-killing' theories? How does Hare show that constraint-against-bad-killing theories generate conflicts between reasonable beneficence and morality?
3. Speaking of Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve's argument against the ex-ante Pareto principle, Hare says "[i]n cases like this, where things of incommensurable value (like people's lives) are at stake, it makes perfect sense to resist the judgments of your better informed self." Why might this be true? Do you find this plausible?
4. What are the first two arguments Hare discusses for the claim that extreme progressivism and constraint-against-bad-killings are mistaken about reasonable beneficence (p.457)?
5. What is the basic idea behind Hare's argument from composition? What is the Six Tracks case?
6. What is premise one of Hare's argument? What reasons do we have to accept or reject it? Is the Surgeon example an appropriate analogue?
7. What is premise two of Hare's argument? Is it plausible? What's the difference between weak agglomeration and strong agglomeration?
8. How is Six Tracks different from Footbridge with Suitcases? How does Hare overcome this disanalogy?

9. In his discussion of 'Two Parallel Tracks and Six Buttons', what does Hare mean by saying a decision is 'private'? What is 'defeasible privacy'? How are these concepts relevant to his argument?
10. What are the two sets of norms which Hare has shown to be inconsistent? What are the larger upshots for ex-post theorising?
11. Why is Hare concerned with discussing 'nearby cases'? What are the variants he considers?
12. In §6, Hare discusses the known victim cases. How does his discussion interact with our previous discussion of *ex-post* designators?

### **Kacper Kowalczyk's 'People in Suitcases'**

13. What are permissivism, *ex-post* deontology and ex-ante deontology, and what do each say about Opaque Footbridge?
14. What Nozickian reasoning does Kowalczyk give to support the claim that the ex-ante perspective should appeal to deontologists?
15. What is the problem with ex-ante deontology's assessment of Case One? What is sequential Pareto?
16. What does Hare's view say about Case One? What are the other reasons Kowalczyk has for being suspicious of Hare's view?
17. What is 'sophisticated ex-ante deontology'? How might it deal with the problem posed by Case One? How does it fail in Case Two?
18. What is 'resolute ex-ante deontology'? How does it deal with the cases presented? Is it independently plausible?
19. How does Kowalczyk improve upon Hare's argument regarding cyclic preferences? What is the 'Timer Case'? What is 'causal fetishism'?